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In this paper, we employ a quantified general equilibrium model to study the 
effects of changes in marginal income-tax rate structures on the distribution of income. 
Our approach builds on recent efforts by Fullerton and Rogers (1  993) in extending the 
well-known work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to allow for many different cohort 
types, and hence a nontrivial endogenous distribution of income.  In addition, we utilize 
(and describe) a solution algorithm that allows us to study the distributional consequences 
of distortions on labor and consumption arising from actual discrete rate structures taken 
from the U.S. tax code. 
Focusing on variations of the 1965, 1977, 1984, and  1989 U.S. rate schedules, our 
main conclusions are as follows: 
1. The distortionary effects of marginal rate structures on individual saving and 
labor-supply decisions may explain significant elements of recent trends in income 
inequality.  For example, the model predicts a change in the Gini index of inequality 
between 1984 and 1989 that is almost half of the change that actually occurred. 
2.  "Static"  revenue calculations -- those assuming no change in behavior following 
marginal rate changes -- substantially overstate the long-run revenue effects of shifting 
from our alternatives to the 1989 tax structure. For example, under static assumptions, 
replacing the 1977 tax code with that from 1989 causes steady-state revenue to fall. 
However, the full general-equilibrium impact causes long-run revenues to increase slightly. 
3.  Compared to the 1977 and 1984 tax structures, a shift to the 1989 code yields 
steady-state welfare gains that are strongly concentrated among individuals at the upper 
tail of the lifetime income distribution. Furthermore, for these cases, a rising tide does not 
raise all boats:  Those at the lower end of the lifetime income distribution have higher 
utility in steady states under the alternatives, even though long-run aggregate income is 
higher under the 1989 regime. 
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Change is the constant of U.S. tax policy.  Since the early 1960s, the federal 
personal income tax code has undergone three major reforms and numerous minor 
revisions.  All of the major legislative changes -- passed into law in  1964, 198  1, and 1986 
-- involved, among other things, substantial alterations in the structure of marginal tax 
rates.'  Economists, trained to believe that prices and incentives affect human behavior, 
are inclined to accept the theoretical proposition that these changes matter. But how 
much they matter is an item of considerably more dispute, and most agree that the issue is 
ultimately empirical. 
Much of the current interest in tax rate structures has focused on the related issues 
of income distribution and revenue generation, with the empirical arms of this research 
broadly embracing the contribution of tax changes to trends in income inequality and the 
search for quantitative estimates of so-called Laffer curve relationships. In this vein, 
Feenberg and Poterba (1  993), Feldstein (1  993), Lindsey (1  990, 1993), and Slemrod 
(1993) all provide research that directly attacks these questions in light of recent tax 
reforms.  From these studies, a consistent picture emerges of "a very substantial response 
of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates" (Feldstein [1993, page 21).  This 
observation is particularly strong for high-income taxpayers, who have been confronted 
with larger changes in tax rates than most of the general population, and have greater 
opportunities for adjusting to them. 
Most of the conclusions in these studies are reached by  examining or extrapolating 
from publicly available tax-return data. In this paper, we pursue a complementary 
empirical strategy by building on the computable general equilibrium framework pioneered 
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). In particular, we adopt their basic simulation 
approach, with two key extensions: First, we follow the recent work of Fullerton and 
An excellent overview of these changes is provided in Pechman (1987). 
1 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfRogers (1993) and allow for many types of life-cycle agents, each distinguished by its 
labor efficiency endowments, and hence lifetime wealth.  Second, we use a simple 
algorithm for solving Auerbach-Kotlikoff models with discrete tax codes. This second 
innovation allows us to examine marginal tax rate structures in their literal form. 
Our basic approach is as follows: We take 1989 as a benchmark and calibrate the 
model so that, given the 1989 rate structure and plausible intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution in labor and consumption, the steady-state values we obtain from our 
simulations match both the usual aggregate variables (the capital-output ratio, the risk-free 
interest rate, average tax rates, and so on) and the distributional characteristics (such as 
the Gini coefficient) implied by  1989 tax-return data. Based on the resulting quantitative 
framework, we examine the effects of different historical rate structures on the distribution 
of income. 
Several characteristics of these experiments help to complete the pictures drawn by 
earlier studies. First, conditional on the model's structure and parameterization, our 
simulation approach provides a clear sense of private.labor-supply and saving responses to 
changes in marginal rate schedules. Because we abstract from exogenous variations in all 
other variables (including macroeconomic fluctuations, household characteristics, and net 
tax payments), all changes in the pre-tax distribution of income are due to the 
distortionary effects of the different tax codes we consider. Furthermore, these effects are 
not confounded with changes in tax rules that are distinct from changes in rate structure 
per se.2 
Second, for most taxpayers, tax reform alters the entire life-cycle path of marginal 
tax rates.  This feature of tax policy can be, at best, only partially examined in existing 
microdata sets. Consider, for example, the analysis reported by Feldstein (1993), which 
- 
Our experiments do allow for some variation in basic exemptions and deductions.  We note here that, in 
their studies, Feldstein and Lindsey also attempt to isolate the effects of rate changes from other changes 
in tax policy. 
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Feldstein's approach involves grouping taxpayers according to the marginal tax rates they 
faced in  1985, and comparing the percent changes in income from 1985 to 1988 with 
percent changes in marginal net-of-tax rates (1 minus the tax rate) over the two years.3 
A specific example clarifies the potential contribution of the life-cycle simulations 
we conduct. In our work, the simulation comparable to the natural experiment examined 
by Feldstein contemplates a shift from the 1984 to 1989 rate structures, which are, 
respectively, nearly identical to the 1985 and  1989 codes.  As with Feldstein's  1985 to 
1988 comparison, most taxpayers in the 22 percent rate bracket in  1984 would face a 15 
percent marginal rate in  1989: At the third year of the transition from the 1984 to 1989 
tax code, approximately 17 percent of taxpayers in our model economy would experience 
a decline in the marginal rate from 22 percent to 15 percent, representing an increase of 
about 9 percent in the net-of-tax rate.4 
However, this figure is not generally representative of net-of-tax rates for these 
taxpayers over the remainder of their life cycle. Furthermore, the average lifetime change 
in marginal rates for households in this group varies substantially, ranging from an average 
change in the life-cycle net-of-tax rate of about 8 percent to a scant 0.1 percent.  The 
framework we employ is expressly designed to account for such life-cycle variations in tax 
rates, which, as this example indicates, can be quantitatively important. 
Specifically, across the two years, Feldstein calculates the percent change in marginal tax rates and the 
percent change in various measures of income for three groupings of taxpayers:  Those facing "medium" 
marginal tax rates in 1985 (22 percent to 38 percent), those facing "high" rates (42 percent to 45 percent), 
and those facing "very high" rates (49 percent and 50 percent).  Elasticities are calculated as the ratio of 
differences in percent income changes across the rate groupings relative to the differences in percent rate 
changes.  This general methodology was coined the "differences of differences" approach by Lindsey 
(1987). 
Roughly 23 percent of taxpayers in Feldstein's 1985 sample fall into the 22 percent rate bracket. 
However, unlike our calculations, his sample excludes  joint filers in rate brackets below 22 percent. 
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the explicit utility-maximizing decisions of taxpayers, the welfare consequences of tax- 
induced distributional effects can be directly assessed. 
In each of our experiments, we examine U.S. marginal tax rate structures from 
1965, 1977, and 1984 that have been adjusted for price and real output growth, and 
compare equilibrium outcomes under each to those from the (benchmark) 1989 code. To 
preview our results, we conclude that: 
1.  The distortionary effects of marginal rate structures on individual saving and labor- 
supply decisions may explain significant elements of recent trends in income inequality. 
For example, the model predicts a change in the Gini index of inequality between 1984 
and 1989 that is almost half of the change that actually occurred.  Furthermore, the tax 
code changes we simulate generate distributional effects that are broadly similar to the 
changes observed in the U. S. economy across the four years 1965, 1977, 1984, and 
1989. For example, across these four years, the model generates patterns in the Gini 
coefficient and in the share of income received by  the top 5 percent of income earners 
that are similar to those found in the data. 
2.  "Static" revenue calculations -- those assuming no change in behavior following 
marginal rate changes -- substantially overstate the long-run revenue effects of shifting 
from our alternatives to the 1989 tax structure. For example, under static 
assumptions, replacing the 1977 tax code with that from 1989 causes steady-state 
revenue to fall.  However, the full general-equilibrium impact causes long-run 
revenues to increase slightly. 
3. Compared to the 1977 and 1984 tax structures, a shift to the 1989 code yields steady- 
state welfare gains that are strongly concentrated among individuals at the upper tail of 
the lifetime income distribution.  Furthermore, for these cases, a rising tide does not 
raise all boats:  Agents at the lower end of the lifetime income distribution have higher 
utility in steady states under the alternatives, even though long-run aggregate income is 
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rate regimes are very small for both lower- and middle-income taxpayers, and in many 
cases are dominated by general equilibrium effects on wages and interest rates. 
In the next section, we lay out the basic structure of our framework. In section 3, 
we describe our calibration exercise, emphasizing the distributional aspects of the 
quantified model.  The balance of the paper is devoted to presenting the results 
summarized above. 
2.  The Model Economy 
A.  Households and  Preferences 
Our model economy is populated by sequences of distinct cohorts that are 
distinguished by date of birth and lifetime labor productivity endowments. Each 
generation born at a specific date contains 13 separate agent types, indexed by j, each with 
different exogenous labor efficiency profiles.  With the exception of size, successive 
generations ofj-type agents are identical.  All agents live 60 periods with perfect certainty, 
and each  j-type cohort is l+n times larger than its predecessor. 
Agents "born" at calendar date b choose perfect-foresight consumption (c) and 
leisure (I) paths to maximize a time-separable utility hnction of the form 
where ui > 0,  uii < 0, lim i+m  ui = 0, limi+, ui =  oo, and ui is the partial derivative of the 
hnction u(.) with respect to argument i. The form of the utility function and the 
subjective time-discount factor p are assumed to be the same for all agents.  We require 
that P>O, but need not impose the condition that P<1. 
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maximization of equation (1) is subject to a sequence of budget constraints given, at each 
time s, by 
where r,  is the real return to capital held from time s-1 to s, and z:,  refers to lump-sum 
transfers from the government.  We assume that aggregate wage payments at each time s, 
w,,  are distributed according to the efficiency levels of individual labor units. 
Furthermore, we assume that an individual worker's labor efficiency level is solely 
determined by his age and the lifetime income cohort of which he is a member.  Thus, we 
denote the efficiency level of an age t member of cohort j  by  E:  ,  wj, = E:w,. 
The function T@,)  is identical for all taxpayers and depends on taxable income, 
defined generally as jjls = yh -  d(y{,),  where yh = rsaj_l,s-I  +  w:,  (1 -  l;,),  and the 
hnction d(.) specifies deductions and exemptions as a function of gross income. 
Throughout, we will assume that d(.) is a linear function with a strictly positive first 
.' 
deri~ative.~  We do not require that the function T(.) be everywhere continuous and 
differentiable.  In fact, our analysis is conducted using U.  S. personal income-tax codes that 
have the familiar discrete step-function structures. 
B.  Firnts and  Technology 
Output in the model economy is produced by identical competitive firms that 
combine capital and labor using a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production 
technology. Letting yJ be the fraction ofj-type agents in each generation, aggregate 
capital (K)  and labor (L) supplies (in per capita terms) are obtained from individual 
supplies as 
Although this assumption is not necessary, it provides a reasonable description of historical income-tax 
structures in the United States in that simple linear regressions of deductions plus exemptions on income 
fit the data with a high R~. 
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where n is the constant rate of population growth. Note that, for simplicity, we have 
normalized the population so that the total number of age-60 agents is one, for all s. 
The aggregate per capita production technology is written in terms of the capital- 
labor ratio, K, as 
where qs  is per capita output and f  (a)  is defined such that f'  > 0,  f"  < 0, lim ,,,  f' = 0, 
and lim ,,,  f' = oo .  The competitive wage and interest rates are given by 
w,  =  qs  -  Kf'(9  (6) 
and 
rs = f  '(s)  -  6, 
where Sis  the depreciation rate of physical capital. 
C.  The Government 
Our interest in this paper is solely in the distortionary effects of different income- 
tax structures. Consequently, the government in our model has a very simple role:  It 
raises revenue from income taxes, which it then rebates in the form of lump-sum payments 
to the individuals from whom taxes are collected. Thus, the government's activities in 
each period s are hlly captured by the "rule" 
T@ls)  = z:,,  (8) 
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experiments, and effects from government policy arise only from the distortionary impact 
of the income-tax system. 
3.  Model Calibration 
Our model is calibrated to Internal Revenue Service Statistics of  Income data for 
the taxable returns of married persons filing jointly in  1989. In what follows, all references 
to income, taxpayers, and so on, should be understood as applying to this population. 
Most of our choices for parameterizing the model are standard. Exceptions 
involve the special features of our framework, specifically, the tax codes and the 13-agent- 
type structure. We therefore turn first to a discussion of how we quantifi these elements, 
followed by a discussion of the more familiar choices for preference and technology 
parameters.  This section concludes with an overview of the equilibrium outcomes 
generated by our benchmark parameterization. 
A.  Labor EfJiciency  ProJiles 
The exogenous labor efficiency profiles in equations (2) and (4) are based on 
estimates provided by Fullerton and Rogers (1993), who use data from the Michigan Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to calculate life-cycle labor endowments.6 Using the 
notation developed above, and assuming that life begins in adulthood at age 20, these 
estimates imply that the labor efficiency endowments of a type j, age t agent are of the 
form 
<' =  ebo+b,t+b2t2+b3t3 
- 
Focusing on a subsample that includes only households with stable marital histories over the 1970-1987 
period, Fullerton and Rogers first fit a common wage function across all individuals.  Specifically, they 
regress the log of average hourly earnings for each individual on a cubic in age and the interaction age 
and age-squared with sex, education, and race.  The  coefficients thus estimated are used to construct 
synthetic individual wage observations outside the 18-year period covered by the sample, as well as 
missing observations within the sample, which are then combined with actual wage observations to 
calculate lifetime incomes for all households. Finally, individuals are classified by lifetime income level 
into one of 12 groups, and separate wage profiles are estimated for each of the groups. 
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of lifetime income, can be found in tables 4-1 1 of Fullerton and Rogers. 
Unfortunately, when we calibrate so that mean income from the model matches 
mean income in the Fullerton-Rogers data, the income levels implied by the 12-group 
disaggregation are "too low" at the top of the distribution. In particular, we cannot, using 
the Fullerton-Rogers estimates alone, simultaneously match average income and generate 
incomes for the "rich" that are sufficient to yield a satisfactory distribution. 
To solve this problem, we add a thirteenth lifetime income cohort whose labor 
efficiency profile is proportional to that of the twelfth group.  The intercept of the profile 
for this group is chosen so that, in the benchmark case, the top 6 percent of taxpayers 
(those with incomes over $100,000) earn 26 percent of total income, matching the values 
reported in the 1989 tax data.7 
B.  Tax Codes 
As noted, our analysis uses marginal tax rate schedules for married persons filing 
jointly in  1965, 1977, 1984, and  1989 -- codes that represent various vintages of tax 
legislation. To provide a common basis for comparison, all rate-bracket income limits are 
adjusted for average real income growth between 1989 and the relevant alternative tax 
year, and then are converted to constant 1989 dollars using the CPI-U.  By adjusting the 
pre-1989 tax codes in  this way, we focus primarily on differences in their treatment of 
relative income in relation to the 1989 benchmark.  That is, we attempt to answer how 
individuals in  1965, 1977, and 1984 responded to their respective prevailing tax codes 
given their real income that year. 
The population distribution of lifetime income cohorts 1 through 12 are obtained from tables 4-1 1 in 
Fullerton and Rogers (1993). ~ettin~  y "  , j' =1 ... 12, be the proportion of weighted observations for the 
12 groups in the Fullerton-Rogers sample, we set yI3  = 0.06 and then set Y' =  Y  "(1 -  yI3)  ,  for 
j=l  ... 12. 
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effect of our adjustments for nominal income growth, as these years effectively represent 
the initial and terminal dates of the nominal schedule specified by the Tax Reform Act of 
1964.8 Taxable incomes of $50,000, for example, were subject to a marginal tax rate of 
50 percent in both years.  However, the same real income would be subject to a 36 
percent marginal rate under our adjusted version of the 1965 structure and 45 percent 
under the adjusted 1977 schedule.  The difference between the rates for these two years 
reflects "bracket creep" that arises from both real income growth and inflation. 
The essence of our adjustments to the statutory rate structures is as follows: 
Suppose that inflation and real income growth have no independent effect on the 
distribution of income.  Then, holding all else fixed, an individual with taxable income of 
$50,000 in  1989 would occupy the same relative position in the income distribution as one 
with taxable income of about $43,000 in  1984, $37,000 in  1977, and $26,000 in  1965. 
Our experiments amount to applying the alternative rate structures to the 1989 
distribution of income after hypothetically indexing for drift in the mean of nominal 
income.  Thus, although income growth does contribute to differences across the pre-1989 
structures, we abstract from such effects when directly comparing any of the alternatives 
with the 1989 rate str~cture.~ 
Our approach intentionally excludes many obvious, and important, forms of tax 
avoidance -- Subchapter C filing and the transformation of compensation into nontaxable 
benefits, for example. However, we do incorporate adjustments for personal exemptions 
and deductions by positing that these adjustments are linear finctions of gross income. 
With this assumption in hand, we use the Statistics of Inconze  data to calculate average 
The 1964 rate structure was transitional. Also, the schedules were temporarily modified in tax  years 
1968-1970 by subsequent legislation. 
Our approach amounts to assuming that each rate structure is perfectly indexed for inflation and real 
growth.  We have repeated all of the experiments reported in this paper with alternative tax structures that 
are adjusted only for the rate of inflation. A summary of the results without the real growth corrections is 
provided in section 4D. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfexemptions and deductions by listed income classes, which are then regressed on the 
midpoint income of each class.  These estimated knctions are used in the model to 
convert gross income to taxable income. 
A broad sense of the separate rate structures we use is provided in figure 1, which 
plots effective marginal tax rates for incomes up to $350,000 (in 1989 dollars), with each 
tax code adjusted as explained above.  (This value is in the range of the highest gross 
income obtained in our benchmark simulation.) Table 1 gives the estimated knctions for 
deduction and exemption adjustments for each of our four tax codes. Because standard 
deductions were incorporated into actual rate structures in tax years 1977 through 1986, 
the adjustment knctions used in simulations under the 1977 and 1984 codes are estimated 
from exemption levels only.  However, to ease comparability, implied standard deductions 
are included in the knctions for 1977 and 1984 shown in figure 1 and table 1.10 
Finally, we note that, although the top marginal tax rate was 70 percent in  1977, 
different rates were applied to labor income and capital income, with the top rate on the 
former being, hypothetically, capped at 50 percent (see Lindsey [I98  11 and Slernrod 
[1993]).11 Adequate treatment of this and related issues would require modifLing the 
model to accommodate differential taxation of income from different sources, a task we 
do not undertake in this paper.  However, as we report in section 4D, parallel experiments 
with back-of-the-envelope adjustments for this feature of the 1977 code suggest that none 
of our major conclusions is altered by ignoring these complications. 
C.  7he Prodzrction Technology: Scaling the Model 
Our simulation exercises assume that per capita aggregate product is given by 
lo See Pechman (1987, appendix B) for a more thorough discussion of zero-bracket provisions in the 
personal income-tax code.  The "standard deduction" levels and intercepts of the adjustment functions 
shown in table 1 are adjusted for inflation and real income growth. 
In addition, variations in the treatment of capital gains introduced further distinctions in effective rate 
schedules for some taxpayers, as did the various payroll tax provisions in force during the years we are 
examining. 
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value for 8 is 0.36, and physical capital is assumed to depreciate 10 percent per period. 
Both of these choices are motivated by familiar long-run observations on capital shares 
(see, for example, the arguments in Kydland and Prescott [1982]).  In addition, population 
growth is 1.3 percent per year, the postwar U.S. average. 
Unlike many other calibrated simulation exercises, the scale factor A does play a 
role in our experiments. In particular, because we are studying actual marginal rate 
brackets, it is necessary to scale the model such that generated incomes can be sensibly 
applied to the chosen tax codes.  Essentially, we choose A so that the mean income 
generated in the model's benchmark steady state equals the average gross income of joint 
filers in tax year 1989. In practice, matching the data in this way requires that the scale 
factor A and the intercept of the labor efficiency profile of the "richest" cohort (group 13, 
described above) be chosen simultaneously.~2 
D.  Preferences 
We specialize the utility hnction in equation (1) to the isoelastic form 
where the preference parameters a and a represent the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of leisure and the utility weight of leisure, respectively.  This formulation of 
preferences has the property that the capital-labor ratio is invariant to the scale factor A in 
l2 It is possible to embed exogenous labor-augmenting technical progress into A, but we have chosen not 
to do so.  While it is certainly easy, by a suitable change of variables, to solve the model with such an 
exqension, the notion of a steady state becomes solnewhat slippery when we contemplate both economic 
growth and the type of progressive tax systems that we are considering.  In particular, in a growing 
economy with an unchanging tax code, all taxpayers will face the highest marginal tax rate in the long 
run.  Thus, steady-state comparisons in our model implicitly assume that the relevant tax codes are 
indexed to real growth. 
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evidence culled from studies using disaggregated labor-market data. The parameter a is 
chosen such that steady-state hours worked by  the "average" individual at peak 
productivity are slightly greater than one-third of the total time endowment, which we 
take to be 16 hours per day. l4 
Most empirical studies find values for the subjective discount factor P in the 
neighborhood of 1  .O, sometimes slightly lower (for instance, Hansen and Singleton 
[1982]), sometimes slightly higher (for instance, Eichenbaum and Hansen [1990]). We 
choose a benchmark value of 0.99, which is consistent with satisfactory computed values 
of the long-run interest rate. 
E.  The Benchmark Equilibriunt 
Our benchmark parameter choices result in a steady-state pre-tax real interest rate 
of about 3.04 percent (which is reasonably close to the apparent historical average of real 
pre-tax returns on long-maturity riskless bonds in  the United States)15  and a steady-state 
l3 Scale invariance follows from the fact that changes in the level of wages have offsetting income and 
substitution effects on individual labor-supply decisions.  (This property is also exploited  in real business 
cycle models with positive rates of labor-augmenting technical progress. See, for instance, King, Plosser, 
and Rebelo [1988]). Apart from this theoretical argument, evidence from state-level data reported by 
Beaudry and Wincoop (1992) suggests preferences that are logarithmic in consumption.  Beaudry and 
Wincoop further claim (footnote 10) that they found no evidence supporting either nonseparabilities 
between consumption and leisure or the absence of time separability in consumption, results that generally 
support the specification in equation (17).  However, unlike our model, their maintained model includes 
"rule-of-thumb" consumers, or individuals who do not behave according to the pure life-cyclelpermanent- 
income hypothesis. 
l4 Standard empirical studies provide estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor 
( 77 ). Because leisure accounts for approximately two-thirds of the total time endowment, 77 w 20  . 
Thus, our choice of o implies a labor elasticity of about 0.5.  MaCurdy's (1981) study of men's labor 
supply suggests elasticities in the range of 0.1 to 0.45, a result that is largely confirmed in related studies 
(see Pencavel [1986]). Although our labor elasticity choice is at the high end of these estimates, Rogerson 
and Rupert (1991) argue that, because of corner conditions, estimates of the degree of intertemporal 
substitution obtained from conventional analyses of male labor supply are likely to be understated. 
Furthermore, despite greater disparity in estimates obtained from studies of female labor supply, there is 
broad agreement that the elasticity is higher for women than for men (see Killingsworth and Heckman 
[1986]).  In any event, our quantitative results do not appear to be sensitive to the choice of o ,  as we 
show in section 4D. 
l5  See Siegal(1992), who reports average rates for the 1800-1990 period.  We note, for the record, that 
average real rates appear to differ significantly across subperiods. Specifically, real returns to long-term 
bonds averaged 1.46 percent over the period 1889-1978,  but 5.76 percent outside that interval. 
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in the United States over the 1959-1990 period).16 
In addition to matching these standard aggregate variables, our calibration exercise 
is designed to deliver congruence between the benchmark model's tax- and income- 
distribution characteristics with those derived from 1989 tax-return data.  Some of the 
relevant comparisons along these dimensions are reported in table 2. 
As indicated by the Gini coefficient, the distribution of income in  the model is 
somewhat more equal than that exhibited by  the data. This results in large part from the 
fact that, even after our adjustments to the Fullerton-Rogers estimates described above, 
the framework still underrepresents taxpayer incomes at the highest end of the 
distribution. Although our simulations closely match the fraction of income earned by the 
top 5 percent of income earners -- not surprising, since our calibration approach 
essentially engineers this outcome -- the share of the top 1 percent is less than half that 
found in the data. This difference is clearly illustrated by the Lorenz curves plotted in 
figure 2. 
A more detailed view of the model's distributional features is found in figures 3 and 
4, which compare actual and simulated distributions of gross income and taxes paid 
according to the classifications provided in Statistics of Inconze.  The most significant 
discrepancy between the two is the concentration of model income in the $40,000 to 
$50,000 range, a difference that is especially pronounced for gross income.  The bunching 
of income in this range is partially a result of our scaling procedures, which focus on 
matching mean income in the model to that in the data. 
As fbrther indicated by  table 2, our benchmark model does quite well at matching 
the broad characteristics of the actual 1989 tax distribution: Simulated average and 
l6 The measure used to construct the U.S. capital stock is the constant-cost net stock of reproducible 
tangible wealth reported in the January 1992 Sulvey of  Current Busir?ess. This measure includes 
consumer durables and government capital. 
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Furthermore, the distribution of income generated by  the model among the different 
marginal rate brackets is very close to that obtained from actual tax returns. 
F.  A Brief Comment on Solving the Model 
Allowing for these discrete marginal tax-rate structures introduces certain 
difficulties in  computing the model solutions.  In particular, straightforward application of 
the algorithms described by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) requires continuous rate 
functions. However, because we are performing tax-compensated experiments, there exist 
alternative structures with continuous rate functions that generate the same equilibrium 
solutions as under our discrete rate functions, thus allowing application of the Auerbach- 
Kotlikoff methods.  Details on these issues and our approach to solving the model appear 
in the appendix. 
4.  Income Tax Structure and the Distribution of Income:  1965-1989 
Using the model calibrated to 1989 tax returns as a benchmark, our strategy is to 
compare actual changes in the distribution of income that occurred over the four years 
1965, 1977, 1984, and 1989, with the tax-induced distributional changes implied by our 
quantified model.  We focus on shifts in overall inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, and in the share of pre-tax income earned by high-income taxpayers. Such 
changes can occur for several reasons:  First, the income distribution can vary because of 
factors entirely unrelated to tax policy.  Second, tax rules can change, adding or deleting 
feasible strategies for sheltering income.  Third, changes in marginal tax rates can alter 
incentives to engage in existing shelter opportunities. Fourth, changes in marginal tax 
rates can alter individual labor-supply and saving decisions.  Our approach here is 
designed to isolate variations in income distribution arising from this fourth cause. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the time series of Gini coefficients for tax years 1965-1989, 
calculated from adjusted gross income figures reported in the Statistics of  Income.17  The 
observed trend in this inequality measure -- relatively constant values through the 1970s 
followed by  steady increases through most of the 1980s -- matches that found in other 
studies of the same period using alternative data sets and examining different populations 
(see, for example, Karoly [1993]). 
Table 3 lists the specific values of Gini coefficients for 1965, 1977, 1984, and 
1989, along with the steady-state values calculated from the model under each year's tax 
regime. To make the comparisons somewhat more concrete, we also report a money 
metric for inequality suggested by  Blackburn (1989). Comparing any two years (arranged 
in chronological order for convenience), the Blackburn measure provides the dollar 
amount of lump-sum tax in the initial year that must be taken from all individuals below 
the median income, and then transferred to all individuals above the median income, in 
order to generate the value of the Gini coefficient from the later year.  In the calculations 
reported in table 3, a positive Blackburn value implies a greater degree of inequality under 
the 1989 tax code than under the relevant alternative. 
Consider first the model outcomes. Arranged in  "chronological" order, the 
simulated Gini coefficients demonstrate a very pronounced U-shaped pattern over the four 
tax codes: The 1977 and 1984 rate structures, which produce nearly identical Gini 
measures, generate less inequality than does the 1965 structure.  The income distribution 
induced by the 1989 code is, in turn, identical to that under the 1965 code (in terms of the 
calculated Gini coefficient). Relative to either the 1977 or 1984 rate structures, both the 
1965 and 1989 systems are equivalent, in  distributional impact, to taking approximately 
l7  Because of data limitations, the coefficient values for tax years 1975-1976 and 1979-1981 are 
interpolated. 
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amount to all those above the median. 
How do these patterns match with the data?  Contrasted with the U-shaped 
pattern exhibited in our simulations, the Gini coefficients extracted from the data evolved 
in a J-shaped fashion over the four years.  In addition, the distributional changes seen in 
the data are much larger than those generated by the model. 
This, of course, is entirely in line with expectations.  Our experiments are not 
designed to explain distributional shifts in toto, but only those associated with the 
distortionary effects of changes in marginal tax rate functions. Furthermore, it is widely 
understood that  inequality trends over the last two decades have been largely associated 
with nontax developments, an obvious candidate being the documented drift in wage 
differentials for skilled and unskilled labor (see, for example, Levy and Murname [1992]). 
The informational content of our experiments arises exactly from our ability to abstract 
from these "secular" trends, and therefore isolate the distributional consequences of the 
specific aspects of tax policy under consideration. 
In addition, Levy and Murname argue that between-group income inequality -- 
that is, inequality across different age, education, and gender groups -- did decline 
modestly through most of the 1970s. However, this pattern was offset by increasing 
within-group inequality, leading to a relatively flat pattern in overall inequality measures. 
Because members of each age, j-type cohort are identical in our model, our experiments 
are closer in spirit to an examination of between-group inequality trends.  Thus, the U- 
shaped behavior of Gini coefficients uncovered in our simulations is probably closer to the 
relevant pattern of actual inequality than is apparent from a simple comparison with figure 
5.18 
l8  Because the lifetime income cohorts are determined by their labor efficiency profiles, the j types can 
be usefully thought of as involving segregations of individuals according to education or skill levels. 
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trend toward greater income inequality would have been observed before 1977 (the year in 
which the Gini coefficient began its sustained upward trek). In this light, and conditional 
on the reasonableness of our artificial economy, table 3 suggests four major conclusions: 
(1) None of the difference in the broad distribution of income in  1989 versus 1965 
can be explained by hndamental differences in the structure of marginal tax rates. 
Although inequality increased substantially across these two years -- an increase in the 
1965 Gini coefficient to the 1989 level would be equivalent to a (partial equilibrium) 
transfer of $9,662 from below-median to above-median taxpayers -- all of the rise is due 
to nontax developments and/or changes in tax policy other than marginal rate differences. 
(2)  The effective rate structure in place in  1977 contributed to a greater degree of 
income equality than would have been realized under one that retained the characteristics 
of the 1965 code.19 Turning again to the Blackburn inequality measure, in the data we 
find that the decline in the Gini index from 1965 to 1977 can be translated into a monetary 
transfer of roughly $788 from above-median to below-median income earners.20  This 
amount is only about one-third of the difference implied by the model. Thus, we conclude 
that tax rate effects across these years exert a stronger influence on reducing inequality 
than would be apparent from a simple cut at the data that does not explicitly isolate the 
effect of tax policy. 
(3)  The marginal rate, exemption, and standard deduction changes associated with 
the Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981 explain virtually none of the substantial 
changes in income inequality between 1977 and 1984: Adjusted for inflation and income 
l9  Recall that the 1965 structure differs from 1977 due to the effects of inflation and real income growth 
between the two years, as well as different treatment of exemptions and deductions. 
20  This rough comparison does not provide a direct analysis of the income distributions in the two years, 
Because the money value of the implied transfer depends on the mean of the reference distribution, direct 
application of Blackburn's arguments 111ould require choosing either 1965 or 1977 as the base year. 
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coefficient. 
(4)  The effective rate structure of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 appears to have 
had a substantial effect on income distribution: Our simulations indicate that changes in 
labor-supply and saving decisions induced by the elements of the 1986 tax reform that we 
study can explain 46 percent of the difference in the Gini between 1984 and 1989, and 42 
percent of the difference in the Blackburn index. 
Three hrther comments regarding point (4) are in order.  First, the comparison is 
not exact because of our adjustments for nominal income. However, the relatively short 
time between these two years minimizes the differences between the nominal rate 
structures faced by households and the adjusted schedules used in  our experiments. 
Second, the results reported in  this section are based on steady-state analysis. 
Thus, the claim that the model captures 46 percent of the difference in the Gini between 
1984 and 1989 requires that the dynamic behavior of the inequality measure is such that it 
converges rapidly to its steady-state value.  In fact, as shown in  figure 6, this is indeed the 
case: In the period of an unanticipated shift from the 1984 tax regime to the 1989 regime, 
the Gini rises to 98.5 percent of its new steady-state value. 
Third, there is some evidence, summarized in Blank and Blinder (1986), that 
inequality is countercyclical. This research is relevant because output growth was 
significantly lower in  1989 than in  any of the other three years from which our tax 
structures are taken.  (The annual growth rate of GDP was 5.6,4.5, and 6.2 percent in, 
respectively, 1965, 1977, and 1984, but only 2.5 percent in  1989.) In light of this, our 
"snapshot" examination of the actual Gini coefficients may overstate the inherent 
(cyclically adjusted) degree of inequality in  the 1989 data, and hence understate the 
fraction of the change in  inequality that is captured by our model. 
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Because reductions in top marginal tax rates constituted one of the most dramatic 
changes implemented by  the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a good deal of recent research on 
tax policy has concentrated on changes in the income share received by high-income 
taxpayers. The general conclusion from such investigations -- several of which are cited in 
the introduction to this paper -- is that the 1986 legislation induced a marked increase in 
these shares. 
Figure 7 reports the income shares of the top 5 percent of taxpayers, from both the 
data and our model simulations, for each of the years we consider.21  With respect to the 
general tendencies found in the tax-return data, the model successfblly predicts the general 
shape in the path of these income shares over time.  However, as with the overall 
distributional picture painted by our examination of trends in the Gini index, the 
distortionary impact of the tax rate structure can account for only a fraction of the 
observed increase in concentration at the top of the income distribution. Still, that fraction 
is substantial. Our simulations indicate that between 1984 and 1989, for example, almost 
half of the increased share of pre-tax income earned by the top 5 percent of earners can be 
attributed to the effects of changes in leisure and consumption incentives brought about by 
tax reform. 
C.  Rate Structure and the Distribution of Lifetime Income 
Over the life cycle, of course, any given household -- both in our model and in the 
real world -- realizes many different levels of income and faces several distinct marginal 
tax rates.  Although it is widely acknowledged that the distributional consequences of 
21  Many recent studies of the 1986 tax reform have focused on the behavior of "very high income 
recipients, typically the top 1 percent of taxpayers. Recall from section 3 that to incorporate high-income 
individuals into our model, we extrapolate from the Fullerton and Rogers (1993) estimates in such a way 
that the benchmark steady state matches the top 6 percent of the income distribution.  A consequence of 
this approach is that we underestimate the share of income of the top 1 percent of taxpayers. In 1989, for 
example, the highest 1 percent among married persons filing jointly earned 13.5 percent of reported 
adjusted gross income on taxable returns.  In contrast, the same group earns 5.8 percent in our model. 
Therefore, our discussion of high-income taxpayers is best suited to a consideration of the top 5 percent. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfparticular tax systems from a life-cycle perspective may be inadequately captured in 
analyses of cross-sectional income, previous studies have failed to uncover dramatic 
differences in the patterns of lifetime vs. annual tax incidence (see, for instance, Davies, 
St-Hilaire, and Whalley [I9841 and Fullerton and Rogers [1991]). 
Similarly, we find in our experiments that the relative impact of the different tax 
regimes on lifetime income distributions is comparable to that found in our previous 
analysis of cross-sectional income.  Although the Gini coefficient values calculated from 
lifetime income groupings are uniformly lower than those calculated in the standard way, 
they exhibit the same U-shaped pattern over the four tax codes (see figure 8). Lifetime 
income here is simply the present value of labor income, which, given the structure of our 
model, is equivalent to wealth. 
Interestingly, inequality shifts resulting from tax structure changes are slightly 
more pronounced in the lifetime income distribution than in the cross-sectional 
distribution: The changes in Gini coefficients, in both absolute and percentage terms, are 
larger when calculated on the basis of wealth than when calculated from cross-sectional 
income.  Thus, our results would contradict an argument suggesting that rising inequality 
associated with recent tax reforms is mitigated when life-cycle income mobility is explicitly 
incorporated. 
D.  Some Sensitivity Analysis 
In table 4, we report steady-state  values for Gini coefficients calculated under 
alternatives to our benchmark parameterization. Specifically, table 4 includes results for 
separate simulations that differ fiom the benchmark experiments because of (i) an assumed 
labor-supply elasticity toward the lower end of the range estimated from microdata, (ii) 
changing the intercept in the pre-1989 adjustment fbnctions such that all structures yield 
the same total steady-state revenue, (iii) eliminating the real income growth correction for 
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income into the assumed rate structure for 1977.22 
As table 4 suggests, our previous conclusions are robust to these alternative 
treatments. In particular, the Gini inequality measures are not much affected by  these 
variations, and comparisons across the four rate structures reveal the same U-shaped 
pattern seen in table 3 and figure 7.  (Note, however, that the pattern for the cases where 
the codes are not adjusted for real income growth more closely resembles the J-shaped 
behavior found in the data.) 
5.  Tax Revenue and Rate Structure:  Static versus Dynamic Analysis 
The results reported in the previous section demonstrate empirically significant 
adjustments of individual labor-supply and saving decisions in response to historically 
relevant changes in marginal tax rates.  Corresponding to these adjustments, of course, are 
changes in the revenues collected from the affected individuals. 
Table 5 summarizes the steady-state equilibrium tax characteristics derived from 
simulations under each of the tax codes. Consider, specifically, the experiments performed 
with the 1977 and 1989 rate structures. Although the former regime yields a higher mean 
tax rate, higher marginal tax rates (on average), a higher top marginal rate, and generally 
greater progressivity toward the upper part of the income distribution, the aggregate 
revenue collected under the 1977 system is slightly lower than obtained under the 1989 
code.  This observation invites a provocative conclusion: Relative to some nontrivial 
alternatives, reductions in marginal tax rates of the magnitude implemented by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 are capable, through private factor supply decisions alone, of 
22  For variation (ii), we search over values of the income-adjustment-function intercept (described in 
section 3B) until aggregate steady-state revenue equals the steady-state revenue obtained in the 1989 
benchmark case.  For variation (iv), we replace the statutory rates in the 1977 code that exceed 50 percent 
with their corresponding "average marginal rates with maximum tax," as reported in table 3.3 of Slemrod 
(1993). 
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suggest the existence of a "Laffer curve" in the relevant region of U.S. history. 
The problem in interpreting the information provided in table 5 is, of course, that 
for most taxpayers -- including those at the top of the income distribution -- the different 
tax structures we consider involve changes in both marginal and inframarginal tax rates. 
Although mixing the effects is legitimate in the context of examining each of the separate 
rate structures in their totality, the inframarginal changes tend to obscure discussion of the 
nexus between actual tax reforms, economic incentives, and aggregate tax revenue. 
However, a fairly direct way to isolate the effect of behavioral distortions of 
specific changes in marginal rate structures is available in our framework by comparing 
"static"  versus "dynamic" revenue outcomes.  In other words, for each pre-1989 tax code, 
we compute static revenue outcomes by applying the 1989 rate structure to the fixed 
equilibrium values of consumption and leisure choices under that alternative.  If the 
distortionary impact of marginal tax rate changes has a quantitatively significant impact on 
tax collections, these static calculations will yield aggregate revenue levels that are quite 
different from their dynamic general equilibrium counterparts. 
Table 6 provides the results of experiments that directly address this question.  The 
numbers reveal a significant divergence between the static and dynamic outcomes. For 
example, under static assumptions, shifting from the 1965 to the 1989 code would raise 
aggregate revenues by just over 40 percent in the long run.  The actual dynamic outcome, 
which incorporates the distortionary impact on individual behavior, indicates that the 
increase would be only 36 percent. 
Because the overall revenue implications of the 1977 and 1984 codes are much 
closer to the 1989 benchmark, the discrepancy between the static and dynamic 
experiments stands in sharper contrast. In the case of shifting fi-om the 1984 alternative to 
the 1989 structure, long-run revenue losses under static assumptions are almost 90 percent 
higher than those realized in full general equilibrium. For the 1977 alternative, static 
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calculations indicate that shifting to the 1989 rate configuration generates a slight gain in 
aggregate revenue. 
To put some perspective on the magnitude of these differences, individual income 
tax collections in 1984 totaled approximately $356 billion (in 1989 dollars).  Given this 
figure, the implied discrepancy between the static and dynamic experiments reported in 
table 6 amounts to a long-run annual revenue shortfall of about $23.5 billion.23 
7.  Income Tax Structure and Economic Welfare 
Ultimately, we wish to know how tax structure affects measures of economic 
welfare.  In this section, we examine the utility losses and gains associated with the 
previously discussed tax-induced changes in income inequality.  For brevity -- and because 
it represents the experiment that most closely replicates the U.S. experience under the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 -- our focus will be on comparing the 1984 and 1989 rate 
 structure^.^^ 
For any individual living in a long-run equilibrium under the 1984 tax structure, we 
calculate the welfare loss of shifting to the 1989 tax system as the percentage decrease in 
full wealth -- defined as the present value of labor income when the individual's entire time 
endowment is allocated to market work -- that is necessary to maintain utility at its initial 
level.  Negative numbers thus represent cases in which lifetime utility is higher under the 
1989 tax structure, and positive numbers those in which lifetime utility is higher under the 
alternative structure. 
23  This number, of course, abstracts from the effects of income growth. 
24 The results reported in this section do not adjust for the fact that the 1984 and 1989 structures imply 
different levels of total revenue from the income tax.  However, all of our primary results obtain when 
steady-state revenues are equalized by adjusting the level of the standard deduction, as described in section 
4D.  Although this procedure alters marginal tax rates for a small number of individuals at the very 
bottom of the income distribution, these parallel experiments leave intact the shape of the rate structures 
themselves.  Thus, the conclusions described in this section also apply to analogous revenue-neutral tax 
reforms. 
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9.  The average (population-weighted) welfare loss associated with changing from the 
1984 to the 1989 structure averages -0.63 percent of full wealth.  In other words, the 
average household gains by a shift to the rate structure implied by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. However, as is clear from figure 9, this average masks a wide range of outcomes 
for the individual lifetime-income cohorts. The very wealthiest group (cohort 13) enjoys a 
welfare gain from tax reform equivalent to a full 2.1 percent of its wealth.  Cohort 2, on 
the other hand, suffers an equivalent wealth loss of 0.4 percent.25 
The pattern of utility effects harbors no surprises when one compares the two 
marginal rate schedules (see figure 1). After our adjustments for inflation, real growth, 
and differences in deductions and exemptions, the 1989 code entails lower rates on most 
gross incomes above $56,000. These income levels are primarily relevant for lifetime 
income groups 10-  13 -- exactly the groups that would experience welfare gains. 
This rather unsurprising outcome repeats itself across all experiments comparing 
the different rate structures: Higher marginal tax rates over the life cycle tend to reduce 
lifetime utility.  For instance, tax rates from the 1977 code are very similar to those of 
1989 up through gross incomes of about $80,000.  At the highest income levels, however, 
rates from the former substantially exceed those from the latter.  Consequently, whereas 
the replacement of 1977 rates with 1989 rates has little impact on most households, the 
effect is substantial for the "rich,"  equaling gains of 0.5 percent and 2.8 percent ofwealth 
for cohorts 12 and 13, re~pectively.~G 
25  The 1984 steady-state income of cohort 2 ranges from about $5,000 to $25,000, with an average of 
about $20,000.  It should be noted again that the welfare effects in our experiments are due only to the 
substitution effects resulting from the tax changes.  Although the shift from the 1981 to the 1989 tax  code 
results in welfare losses for cohorts with low lifetime incomes, these groups actually pay less in total tax 
revenues under the latter code.  Because revenues are returned to individual agents in a lump sum, our 
welfare numbers do not reflect whether any taxpayer would be better or worse off when changes in tax 
liabilities are included.  In future work, we plan to examine this issue in variations of the model where tax 
receipts are not rebated in lump sum. 
26  Shifting from the 1977 structure generates an average gain of 0.68 percent. 
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se, as opposed to general equilibrium effects on factor prices induced by  these changes. 
Figure 9 also reports the results of partial equilibrium experiments, referred to as the "tax 
effect only" case, in  which we fix the aggregate wage and interest rate at their initial 
steady-state values, then calculate individual consumption and leisure paths under the 
1989 tax code with these fixed aggregate prices.27 As shown, both the qualitative and 
quantitative outcomes are similar to those obtained from the full general-equilibrium 
simulations. 
Finally, figure 10 shows, for selected lifetime income groups, welfare losses along 
the transition path for the representative case of a shift from the 1984 to the 1989 tax 
code.  As before, we suppose that the regime change occurs at time 0 and is unanticipated. 
Consistent with the observation that general equilibrium effects have little impact on 
welfare outcomes, the utility consequences for agents who become economic adults on or 
after the date of the tax reform are virtually identical to those found for the steady state. 
Losses and gains for individuals already alive at the time of the change tend to decrease 
monotonically in age, as illustrated by the patterns of lifetime income for group 2 (the 
second "poorest" of the groups, and the one that suffers the largest loss from the shift to 
the 1989 code) and group 13 (the "richest" group, and the one that enjoys the largest gain 
from the shift).  Group 8, a middle-income group, is an exception, although the welfare 
effects for this cohort are generally trivial. 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis supports a largely unconfirmed suspicion about the recent evolution 
of tax policy:  The marginal rate changes implemented in  various tax reforms over the past 
several decades are capable of explaining much of the change in U.S. income distribution 
experienced during that time. 
27  Full wealth and the valuation of consumption and leisure paths -- and, hence, our welfare measure -- 
are also calculated assuming the initial interest rate and wage. 
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Karoly (1  993), for instance, has argued that ".  .  . it seems fair to conclude that the rise in 
pre-tax inequality dominates any increase in  post-tax inequality due to a reduction in the 
progressivity of the tax system during the 1980s." While our results do not contradict this 
statement, they do suggest a renewed emphasis on the role of progressivity in the 
determination of the gross-income distribution. 
We also find that tax-created increases in income inequality correspond to rising 
"utility inequality": The highest lifetime income group gains in both income share and 
utility from the 1989 tax structure. The lowest lifetime income group, on the other hand, 
suffers utility losses and would prefer any of the other alternatives. 
The welfare effects for the "poorest" lifetime income groups are particularly 
interesting for the experiments with the 1977 and  1984 alternatives because these groups 
lose utility from a shift to the 1989 regime, even though aggregate income increases. 
Thus, general equilibrium spillover effects from the lower rates for top incomes in the 
1989 code -- effects that are, somewhat lamentably, referred to as "trickle down" in 
popular jargon -- are not sufficient to improve the welfare'of those at the bottom of the 
income distribution. However, we emphasize that welfare improvements for the "winners" 
under the 1989 tax structure are very large relative to the resulting welfare reductions of 
the "losers." Although we have not explicitly calculated equilibria with transfer schemes 
that preserve the utility levels of this latter group, it is clear that such Pareto-improving 
policies exi~t.2~ 
Generally, our results confirm the substantial effects that real-world rate 
differentials can be expected to have under sensible assumptions about household 
substitution elasticities. Not surprisingly, we do not generally find that, viewed in its 
28  A usual procedure is to consider a set of lump-sum transfers as a compensating scheme (as, for 
instance, in Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987]).  An interesting, and more realistic, alternative would be an 
expansion of earned-income credits offset by other (distortionary) adjustments for higher-income 
individuals.  We plan to examine this issue in future work. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfentirety, the 1989 rate structure could plausibly be expected to deliver increased revenues. 
Nonetheless, the behavioral responses to rate changes are large, and the model testifies to 
the importance of dynamic analyses of contemplated tax reforms. 
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Although our model is similar in most respects to the structures pioneered by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, for example) and extended by Fullerton and Rogers 
(1 993), the solution techniques are complicated by allowing for discontinuous tax codes 
that imply nondifferentiable budget surfaces. Fortunately, it is possible to construct 
artificial continuous tax codes that yield the same first-order conditions as the model with 
a discrete marginal tax-rate structure, which in turn allows a straightforward application of 
the algorithms described by Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
To outline the general approach, suppose that we have a simple two-bracket tax 
code given by 
which holds for all j-type agents, at all ages t, and all times s. Relative to a more standard 
case with a continuous marginal tax-rate function, the optimization problem confronting 
an individual facing the discrete tax code in (Al) differs by the addition of the constraint 
When this constraint binds, jjlS = 7,  and, suppressing the time subscripts s  for 
convenience, the first-order necessary conditions are 
and 
-A,-,  +A,p  [l+r(l-rL)]-rpp:(rL  -  rH)  = 0, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfwhere, for all j types, u:,  denotes the age t marginal utility of consumption (i=c) and 
leisure (i=Z),  iZ', is the LaGrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in 
equation (2) of the text, and ,u:  is the LaGrange multiplier associated with the constraint 
in equation (A2). 
It is straightforward to veriQ that there exists a continuous marginal tax-rate 
finction with rates given by 
that also satisfies the necessary conditions (A3)-(A5). Because we perform only tax- 
compensated experiments, the equivalence of the first-order conditions is sufficient to 
guarantee the equivalence of equilibrium outcomes. Thus, our solution approach 
essentially involves replacing discrete rate structures, as in (Al), with alternative 
continuous codes similar to those implied by  (A6). 
To sketch the proof demonstrating the validity of this replacement, note that the 
hypothetical continuous rate structure is identical to the actual tax code when the 
conditions (r  , = rL,  y:  <  y"}  or (r,  = rH,  y: >  y"}  are satisfied.  Thus, we will focus on 
the case where the constraint (r, -  rH)@: -7) 2  0 is binding.  For simplicity, we discuss 
only the steady state, recognizing that transition-path solutions are directly analogous 
under the assumption of perfect certainty. 
For a given household (dropping the  j index for notational simplicity), define 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfwhere G(a)  denotes the transition equations defined by the budget constraints in equation 
(2) of the text, a*  is the asset choice that solves 
V(a) r  max (rr(c,  1) +  @'(a1)), 
~~1.a 
and a' represents next period's asset choice. 
Because u(.) is concave, W(a),  is concave.  Furthermore, W(n)  is continuously 
differentiable if its derivative,  W1(a),  exists and is continuous. If W1(a) is continuous, 
then  V1(a) is continuous (see Benveniste and Scheinkman [1979]). To demonstrate the 
continuity of W'(a), we need to consider points at which y* = y . That is, we must show 
that, at the indifference points where ? = r '  and i  = r  , wNB1  (a*)  = w,'  (a*),  where B 
indicates that the constraint is binding and NB  indicates that it is not. 
By definition, 7 = ntl[l-  l(a*  )] +  ra* when the income constraint binds.  Thus, 
differentiating (A7) and substituting from this constraint and the first-order conditions 
gives 
1  d~  dl 
WNB (a*)  = uc  -+  u, - 
da  da 
Similarly, by  exploiting the first-order conditions for the unconstrained case, we 
obtain 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfI 
Ws  (a*)  = u, 
w(1- z) 
-  -  u,[l+r(l- z)] 
w(1- z) 
H 
But recall that, by construction, 7 = z + '(  -  Therefore, because p = 0 when  a 
the income constraint no longer binds, from equations (A9) and (A10) we have the desired 
result. 
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Sources:  Internal Revenue Service; and authors' calculations. 
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Sources:  Internal Revenue Service; and authors' calculations. 
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Sources: Internal Revenue Service; and authors' calculations. 
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Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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a.  See the appendix for details on sources and calculations. All dollar amounts are 






b.  Incorporates zero-bracket amounts. 
Formula for Deductions and Exemptionsa 
Maximum of  $20,944  or  $18,410 + 0.12107 
Maximum of  $14,134  or  $12,080 +  0.14537 
Maximum of  $8,368  or  $7,057 + 0,15667 
Maximum of  $9,805  or  $8,280 + 0.15554) 
Sources:  Internal Revenue Service; and authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfTable 2:  Tax and Distributional Characteristics of Benchmark Model 
a.  All data pertain to taxable returns of  married persons filing jointly in 1989, and are 
taken from Statistics of  Income: Individual Tax Returns 1989 and SOI Bulletin, Spring 
1993. 
Gini Coefficient 
Fraction of Income Earned by: 
Top 5% of Income Earners 
Top 1  % of Income Earners 
Average Tax Rate 
Average Marginal Tax RateC 
Share of Gross Income for 
Taxpayers with Taxable 






b.  Upper and lower bounds are calculated using the formulas suggested in Gastwirth 
(1972). 
c.  Average marginal rates are weighted averages, with the weights determined by the 











Sources: Internal Revenue Service; and authors' calculations. 
Dataa 
Lower ~oundb  :  0.394 









clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfTable 3:  Gini Coefficients under Alternative Tax Codes 
a. Data pertain to taxable returns of married persons filing jointly in 1989.  Calculations 
are based on averages of lower- and upper-bound estimates of the Gini coefficient, 
following the formulas provided in Gastwirth (1972). 




Blackburn Inequality ~etricb 
Model 
Data 
Ratio of Model to Data 
b.  Dollar amount of lump-sum transfers that must be made from all individuals below the 
median income to all individuals above the median income in order to maintain the Gini 
inequality index at its benchmark value.  See Blackburn (1989). 
Sources: Statistics of  Income: Individual Tax Returns 1989; SOI Bulletin, Spring 1993; 
and authors' calculations. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfTable 4:  Gini Coefficients for Alternative Experimentsa 
a.  Bold entries represent simulations that differ from the benchmark. 
Benchmark Model 
Model with o =o. lb 
Equal-Revenue 
Experimentsc 
Tax Codes Not 
Adjusted for Real 
Income Growth 
1977 Rate Structure 
Adjusted for 
Maximum Tax on 
Earned Incomed 
b.  o  is the intertemporal elasticity of  substitution in leisure.  See equation (1  1) in the text. 
c.  Revenues are equalized by adjusting the intercept of the linear function used to convert 







d.  Effective tax rates are taken from table 3.3 in Slemrod (1993). 



















clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfTable 5:  Tax Characteristics of Alternative Tax Codes 
a.  Average marginal rates are weighted averages, with the weights determined by the 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9508.pdfTable 6:  Static versus General Equilibrium Revenue Effects 
Source: Authors' calculations. 




Percent Revenue Loss from 





Percent Revenue Loss from 
Shift to 1989 Tax Code: 
General Equilibrium 
-36.0 
-0.1 
7.5 
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